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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the unique features of the twentieth century was the widespread
use of organized nonviolent action and civil disobedience in the pursuit of dra-
matic social and political change around the world. In the West, the most well-
known of these movements are the Indian protests against the British imperial
government led by Mohandas Gandhi, the Civil Rights Movement in the south-
ern United States led by Martin Luther King, Jr., and the decades-long nonvio-
lent portion of the anti-Apartheid movement in South Africa. These are not the
only examples,' however, and the so-called "Arab Spring" or "Arab Awaken-
ing" 2 has recently reminded us that nonviolent action can still be effective in
bringing about drastic social change towards the creation of just and democratic
societies. In reality, nonviolence never ceased being an effective social and po-
litical tool for social change. In conjunction with the principled and strategic use
of nonviolent tactics in seeking social and political change, the twentieth centu-
ry birthed a new legal-political3 mechanism and institution: the Truth Commis-
sion.4 It is no coincidence that these two modem phenomena arrived on the sce-
ne within a relatively short span, just a few decades, of one another.
Truth Commissions, and their various forms,5 have become a prominent
legal-political tool for societies transitioning from violent conflict towards a
I See generally PETER ACKERMAN & JACK DUVALL, A FORCE MORE POWERFUL: A CENTURY
OF NONVIOLENT CONFLICT (2000) (providing an accessible account of twelve of these movements
on five continents, including the three mentioned).
2 The terms "Arab Spring" and "Arab Awakening" refer to a wave of revolutionary protests
that began on December 18, 2010, in Tunisia and have continued through 2012, throughout many
parts of the Arab world. These protests are located in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Bahrain, and multiple
other countries. One of the defining features of many of these protests has been their commitment
to nonviolent methods of social change. See generally United States Institute of Peace, The Arab
Awakening, http://www.usip.org/programs/initiatives/the-arab-awakening (last visited March 14,
2012).
3 I use the term "legal-political" to draw attention to the ambiguous and multivalent social-
institutional nature of truth commissions. They are usually political mechanisms that function in a
similar manner as trials but without the authority of the legal system or the long-standing presence
of the rule of law. In addition, they are often intimately tied to civil society initiatives that cooper-
ate with transitional governments in the pursuit of retributive, distributive, and/or restorative jus-
tice, and/or social, political, and interpersonal reconciliation. The uniqueness of truth commissions
makes them difficult to categorize, but they often have implications in both the political and the
legal spheres of society.
4 See generally PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND
THE CHALLENGE OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS (2d ed. 2011) (detailing a comprehensive survey of
every truth commission in history).
5 See Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARv. HUM. RIGHTS J. 69, 78-83
(2003) (giving a brief history of the rise of truth commissions and their development in the twenti-
eth century, specifically as they relate to transitional justice mechanisms and international human
rights law). The most well-known form of truth commission has been the "Truth and Reconcilia-
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functioning democratic society. One particular form of the truth commission,
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission ("TRC"), has been especially relevant
in nations that have had nonviolent action as an important part of the resistance
and/or transition between oppressive and dictatorial societies to relatively dem-
ocratic societies. South Africa is the most prominent example of this phenome-
non, but the recent TRC in Liberia is another.6 Why this connection? I argue
that it is because certain key philosophical-theological commitments that under-
gird principled nonviolent social action' also undergird the commitment to pur-
sue reconciliation after violent conflict. In situations such as these, where prin-
cipled nonviolent social action was vital to the resolution of a violent conflict,
TRCs can function as a continuation of the nonviolent revolution these societies
experienced. They become an institutionalized legal-political form of the com-
mitments manifested nonviolently in social protest during the times of resistance
and transition.
Using the South African transition as a case study, I argue that TRCs
can be, and sometimes are, the legal-political extension of the nonviolent arm of
a revolutionary social change movement. In making this argument, I will present
the reasons given, especially by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, for the use of non-
violent social protest in apartheid South Africa. I focus on Archbishop Tutu
because of his key roles as a leader of the nonviolent portion of the anti-
apartheid movement and as the Chairperson of the South African TRC. In these
leadership roles, he delivered many public and written statements that gave clear
expression to the foundational principles of his commitments to nonviolence
and reconciliation that motivated his leadership in both of these highly public
roles. A close examination of Archbishop Tutu's arguments for nonviolence
during the conflict 8 and for the use of the TRC after the conflict 9 sheds light on
tion Commission." However, each truth commission is different, and the institution evolves with
each new commission. For example, Kenya has recently implemented a "Truth, Justice, and Rec-
onciliation Commission" to address ethnic violence after a contested election at the end of 2007.
See generally United States Institute of Peace, Truth Commission: Kenya,
http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-kenya (last visited March 14, 2012).
6 See Pray the Devil Back to Hell (Fork Films 2008) (providing an accessible history of the
nonviolent portion of the Liberian resistance to President Charles Taylor and various rebel
groups). See also, generally, Republic of Liberia, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final
Report, http://trcofliberia.org/reports/final-report (last visited February 20, 2012).
7 Following Maria Stephan and Erica Chenoweth, I distinguish between principled and stra-
tegic nonviolence. Advocates of principled nonviolence argue, from religious and ethical convic-
tions, that the use of violence is always immoral. Advocates of strategic nonviolence argue that in
certain contexts nonviolent resistance and coercion are more appropriate and effective tools for
achieving social change than violent resistance. These categories are not mutually exclusive, nor
do they necessarily go hand-in-hand. Rather, there is a rich diversity of reasons for and forms of
nonviolent social action. See Maria J. Stephan & Erica Chenoweth, Why Civil Resistance Works,
33 INT'L SEC., Summer 2008, at 7, 10.
See DESMOND TUTU, THE RAINBOW PEOPLE OF GOD: THE MAKING OF A PEACEFUL
REVOLUTION 92-94 (John Allen ed., 1994). See also MICHAEL BATTLE, RECONCILIATION: THE
UBUNTU THEOLOGY OF DESMOND TUTU 38-50 (1997) (discussing ubuntu).
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the consistency of logic between the two mechanisms-nonviolent civil re-
sistance and the TRC-for transitioning from an unjust government to a demo-
cratic government.
In making clear this connection between the nonviolent portion of the
resistance to the apartheid government and the justifications provided for the
TRC after the conflict, I move beyond much of the academic debate about the
South African TRC and TRCs in general. These debates have focused on binary
and oppositional constructs such as: "truth versus justice,"'o "for-
giveness/reconciliation versus justice,"" "amnesty versus justice,"l2 and "re-
storative justice versus retributive justice." 3 While I will draw on this literature,
my claim moves beyond these arguments because they often seem to function as
if the South African TRC was an institution that was developed "out of the
blue" rather than in the context of a transition to democracy dependent upon a
significant nonviolent movement. 14 The first part of my argument is that in a
society where nonviolence has been a key part of a movement towards democ-
racy, a TRC is the legal-political institution most consistent with those commit-
ments that were effective, at least to some extent, in making the early moves
towards that democracy.
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions become, then, one way that the
values and commitments that undergird nonviolent social change movements,
and those values and commitments that undergird just democratic practice, be-
come institutionalized in a newly formed democratic society. TRCs seek to in-
culcate those values that sustain a principled commitment to nonviolence within
the political culture of a nascent democracy and continue to move toward
achieving the hoped-for end of principled nonviolent social change movements:
namely, a just and reconciled community. Drawing on social-institutional theo-
ry15 and Charles Taylor's formulation of "social imaginaries,"16 I claim TRCs
can begin the process of institutionalizing certain forms of justice necessary for
9 See DESMOND TUTU, No FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS 91-120 (1999).
10 See generally TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS (Robert I. Rotberg
& Dennis Thompson eds., 2000). See also MARTHA MINOw, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND
FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 9 (1998).
1 MINOW, supra note 10, at 9-24.
12 See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Amnesty's Justice, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF
TRUTH COMMISSIONS, supra note 10, at 189-2 10.
13 See, e.g., TUTU, supra note 9, at 54-55.
14 These arguments also create false dichotomies between values like forgiveness, reconcilia-
tion, justice, and order. For a compelling account of the complementary nature of justice to recon-
ciliation, see generally JOHN W. DE GRUCHY, RECONCILIATION: RESTORING JUSTICE 10-42 (2002).
15 See Roger Friedland & Robert R. Alford, Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices, and
Institutional Contradictions, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 232-
63 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991). See also ROBERT N. BELLAH, RICHARD
MADSEN, WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ANN SWIDLER & STEVEN M. TIPTON, THE GOOD SOCIETY 3-16,
287-306 (1991).
16 CHARLES TAYLOR, MODERN SOCIAL IMAGINARIEs 23-30 (2004).
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a functioning democracy, namely "justice as recognition"" and "justice as par-
ticipation,"' 8 while being consistent with the values that sustain and motivate
nonviolent social action, and that they begin the process of reconstituting a
country's social imaginary to be more in line with the social imaginary of non-
violent social activists.
My argument, then, is three-fold. First, TRCs are the natural legal-
political extension of those values that undergird nonviolent social change
movements in post-conflict societies where nonviolent movements were vital to
the resolution of the conflict. Second, TRCs are those legal-political institutions
most capable of being consistent with those values that undergird nonviolent
social change movements while embodying and institutionalizing democratic
forms of justice. Third, TRCs are those legal-political institutions capable of
continuing the process of creating a new social imaginary for a society in transi-
tion begun by the nonviolent movement. The case of the South African TRC is a
helpful case-study for making this argument because of the presence of Arch-
bishop Tutu as a very public figure whose thinking about nonviolent protest and
the work of a TRC were central to the implementation of both.
In Part II, I lay the foundation of my comparison and analysis of the
foundational principles of nonviolence and TRCs through a historical examina-
tion of the case of South Africa. I begin by defining TRCs and then provide
brief histories of the nonviolent movement against Apartheid led by Desmond
Tutu and the South African TRC. I then explore the key foundational principles
that undergirded Tutu's nonviolent action and his leadership of the TRC, ulti-
mately finding expression in his robust commitment to and defense of restora-
tive justice in the South African context.
A. What are Truth and Reconciliation Commissions?
TRCs are usually government-sponsored bodies' 9 commissioned with
the tasks of discovering the truth about extreme injustices and human rights
17 See generally NANCY FRASER & AXEL HONNETH, REDISTRIBUTION OR RECOGNITION?: A
POLITICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL EXCHANGE (Joel Golb, James Ingram & Christiane Wilke trans., 2003)
(providing an account of justice as recognition and how it relates to distributive justice). See also
Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing
Democracy, in JUSTICE INTERRUPTUS: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE "POSTSOCIALIST" CONDITION
69-93 (1997) (providing an account of recognition in the public sphere).
8 See David Hollenbach, Justice as Participation: Public Moral Discourse and the U.S.
Economy, in JUSTICE, PEACE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AMERICAN CATHOLIC SOCIAL ETHICS IN A
PLURALISTIC WORLD 71-83 (1988) (providing an account of justice as participation). See also
BELLAH ET AL., supra note 15, at 135-36 (providing another account of the necessity of democrat-
ic participation for a robust political life in American society).
9 The Greensboro, North Carolina, Truth and Reconciliation Commission was not officially
sponsored by any government body. Rather, it was a civil society initiative. However, at this
point in their development, non-government sponsored and run TRCs are the exception and not
the rule. See generally Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report,
2012] 973
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violations that occurred during a previous government regime, identifying the
role of various parties and actors in the conflicts that led to the recent transition
to the sponsoring government, "affecting the social understanding and ac-
ceptance of the country's past," 20 and promoting and/or facilitating reconcilia-
tion between parties previously at odds.2 1 They are typically instituted in coun-
tries at the beginning of a significant political transition, usually to a more dem-
ocratic form than before,22 but this is not always the case. There have been
TRCs instituted many years after a democratic government has been in place,
but they are the exception.23
TRCs are a recent phenomenon; in many ways they were unthinkable
even forty years ago. The rise of nonviolent revolutions, a global human rights
culture, and the modern expansion of the global public sphere have made it pos-
sible for TRCs to exist.2 4 So, when civil and political conflicts come to an end
through a peace agreement, or some other similar treaty, societies often go about
the arduous task of constructing a new society defined by justice and respect for
human rights in the ashes of one that embodied opposite values.
The progenitors of TRCs were known simply as "truth commissions."
Truth commissions are tasked with investigating human rights abuses commit-
ted by the previous government and other groups that often accompany societies
in transition. Their purpose is to discover and tell the truth of the past and rec-
ognize the experiences of the victims and survivors of the previous regime.25
Priscilla Hayner, the leading historian of truth commissions and TRCs, defines
truth commissions in this way:
A truth commission (1) is focused on the past, rather than ongo-
ing, events; (2) investigates a pattern of events that took place
over a period of time; (3) engages directly and broadly with the
affected population, gathering information on their experiences;
http://www.greensborotrc.org (last visited February 20, 2012). See also HAYNER, supra note 4, at
12, 32.
20 HAYNER, supra note 4, at 11.
21 Id. Hayner points out that there is a growing focus on the promotion of reconciliation in
truth commissions but does not include that goal in her definition because so many truth commis-
sions have historically not pursued that goal. However, I believe that TRCs are a significant
enough evolution away from the earliest truth commissions that they should be understood as
different, though related, mechanisms. In this formulation, it is the promotion of reconciliation
that is the defining difference between a TRC and a simple truth commission.
22 See JOHN ELSTER, CLOSING THE BOOKS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
54-76 (2004). See also generally HAYNER, supra note 4 (analyzing every truth commission
through 2010).
23 For example, the Australian government instituted a TRC to address the forced separation of
aboriginal children from their families to attend schools intended to assimilate them into main-
stream society over twenty years after this practice ended. See HAYNER, supra note 4, at 264.
24 See Teitel, supra note 5, at 70-72.
25 See HAYNER, supra note 4, at 235-36.
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(4) is a temporary body, with the aim of concluding with a final
report; and (5) is officially authorized or empowered by the
state under review.26
TRCs, while being their political descendants, are different than simple
truth commissions.2 7 While they incorporate the purposes of truth commissions,
they are not limited to them. In fact, it is how TRCs go beyond truth commis-
sions that constitute their primary and most important purpose. Hayner claims
that "the intention of truth commissions is part of what defines them." 28 My
claim is that TRCs intend to do more than truth commissions do. 29 Most Sim-
plistically, they also seek to achieve reconciliation; more complexly, I claim that
TRCs intend to reconfigure a society's social imagination, institutionalize dem-
ocratic and just social and political practices, and establish more robust notions
of justice than strictly retributive or distributive models. In doing this, they seek
to establish the conditions that make reconciliation an achievable possibility.30
So, whereas truth commissions are primarily concerned with backward-looking
concerns, discovering and telling the truth about strongly contested histories and
addressing past crimes so that there is some resolution in the social understand-
ing, TRCs are primarily concerned with forward-looking concerns-namely,
reconciliation and the institutionalization of nonviolent democratic practice-
and use their backward-looking functions to serve those purposes.
To do this, TRCs typically include some form of public forum in which
victims and survivors of past atrocities and traumas can tell their stories,3 ' and
many TRCs include some forum for victims and survivors to confront those
perpetrators who have directly impacted their lives. 32 Every TRC also includes
26 Id. at 11-12.
27 See Priscilla Hayner, Same Species, Different Animal: How South Africa Compares to Truth
Commissions Worldwide, in LOOKING BACK, REACHING FORWARD: REFLECTIONS ON THE TRUTH
AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA 32-41 (Charles Villa-Vicencio & Wilhelm
Verwoerd eds., 2000).
28 HAYNER, supra note 4, at 11.
29 Id.
30 See Charles Villa-Vicencio, Getting on with Life: A Move Towards Reconciliation, in
LOOKING BACK, REACHING FORWARD: REFLECTIONS ON THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 27, at 199-209. See also supra note 15.
31 The public nature of testimonies in TRCs is important because truth commissions prior to
South Africa typically held their hearings in private settings. See HAYNER, supra note 4, at 218-
20.
32 For instance, the South African TRC included the possibility for victims and survivors to
confront perpetrators in an informal public courtroom setting, and provided the opportunity for
perpetrators to apologize to and ask forgiveness from those they harmed. See FIONA C. Ross,
BEARING WITNESS: WOMEN AND THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION IN SOUTH AFRICA
27-50 (2003). In a different way, the Liberian TRC provided the space for face-to-face reconcilia-
tion between perpetrators, their victims, and the wider community through the use of traditional
palava hut ceremonies that occurred in local communities throughout the country. See generally
Republic of Liberia: Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Towards National Reconciliation and
2012] 975
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an extensive list of recommendations3 3 that should be implemented for reconcil-
iation to be achieved.3 4 Finally, TRCs conclude in an extensive written final
report, usually well over one thousand pages, that includes a detailed history of
the conflict period and points the way forward to a more just society.3 5
B. The Case of South Africa
Scholarship about principled nonviolence and transitional justice mech-
anisms, especially TRCs, can quickly become too abstract to be applicable in
actual contexts of conflict and political transition. Grounding my analysis in a
specific context, then, will enable it to have the potential to be applicable while
recognizing that no contextual experience of political violence and transition is
universally applicable or easily comparable in other contexts experiencing the
transition from egregious human rights violations to truly democratic govern-
ment. I ground my analysis, then, in the experience of South Africa for three
reasons. First, it instituted the most influential3 6 TRC in the twentieth century;
second, nonviolent civil resistance was an important part of the movement to
end apartheid; and third, Desmond Tutu was a leader of both the nonviolent
civil resistance movement and the South African TRC.
Dialogues: The Palava Hut or Peace Forums, Vol. 3 appendices, Title XII,
http://trcofliberia.org/resources/reports/final/volume-three-12_layout-l.pdf (last visited February
20, 2012).
3 It is important to note that most TRCs, partly to motivate the participation of perpetrators in
the testimony process, do not have any legal or political authority to prosecute individuals or
change public policy. Though they are usually commissioned by governments, they do not often
have the power to implement the social changes deemed necessary after their investigation.
34 These recommendations are often quite comprehensive and include multiple social and
political suggestions. Recommendations for reparations to victims, some limited form of prosecu-
tion for the most egregious violators of human rights, social and economic development, encour-
agements for perpetrators who do not face prosecution to apologize and accept accountability for
their actions, and some form of memorialization are common recommendations of TRCs. The
recent TRC in Liberia has included recommendations for medical treatment for those suffering
from injuries acquired during the protracted civil war and for counseling and vocational services
for former child soldiers. Unfortunately, most countries in transition do not have the infrastructure
or material resources to implement every suggestion. Even more unfortunate is the often lacking
political will to implement those that can be implemented.
35 See Hayner, supra note 27, at 35. See also Charles S. Maier, Doing History, Doing Justice:
The Narrative of the Historian and of the Truth Commission, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY
OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS, supra note 10, at 261, 261-78. See also Charles Villa-Vicencio & Wil-
helm Verwoerd, Constructing a Report: Writing up the "Truth," in TRUTH v. JUSTICE: THE
MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS, supra note 10, at 279, 279-94.
36 For example, Priscilla Hayner lists the South African TRC first in her list of "The Five
Strongest Truth Commissions." See HAYNER, supra note 4, at 27-32.
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1. Why South Africa?
The TRC in South Africa was the first Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission in the world. 37 It distinguished itself from previous truth commissions
by making explicit its goals of reconciliation and attempting to pave a middle-
way between a general amnesty for those who violated human rights norms dur-
ing the Apartheid regime and Nuremberg-style criminal prosecutions of those
who were faithful defenders of the apartheid society.3 8 They rejected amnesty
because of its blatant sense of injustice. 39 They rejected Nuremberg-style trials
for a variety of reasons, 4 0 but the most important one is the inability of such
trials to bring together warring factions in a common purpose and promote rec-
onciliation between political opponents.
In addition, South Africa has been one of the most important places in
the world for the development of nonviolent social change methods and leaders.
The nonviolent portion of the anti-Apartheid movement in South Africa pro-
duced two Nobel Peace Prize winners: Albert Luthuli and Desmond Tutu.4 1
Mohandas Gandhi first experimented with nonviolent protest there and Nelson
Mandela paved the way for reconciliation to be taken seriously as a legitimate
goal of politics during his presidency.42 Finally, if you include South Africa's
3 Technically, Chile held a "National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation" five years
prior to the start of the South African TRC, but the nature of it was more like a "truth commis-
sion" than what later came to be known as a "Truth and Reconciliation Commission." Since South
Africa, many countries have chosen to call their truth commission a "Truth and Reconciliation
Commission" and have modeled their commissions on the South African model. In this sense,
South Africa's TRC was truly the first one of what is now popularly referred to as a "TRC." See
HAYNER, supra note 4, at 256-64.
38 See TUTU, supra note 9, at 30 ("Our country's negotiators rejected the two extremes and
opted for a 'third way,' a compromise between the extreme of Nuremberg trials and blanket am-
nesty or national amnesia. And that third way was granting amnesty to individuals in exchange for
a full disclosure relating to the crime for which amnesty was being sought."). See also Alex
Boraine, Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: The Third Way, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE
MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS, supra note 10, at 141-57.
39 See generally Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights
Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2541-46 (1991).
40 Many of these reasons were pragmatic: South Africa simply did not have the financial re-
sources, manpower, or legal-political structures after the demise of the apartheid government to
put everyone who violated human rights norms on trial. In addition, the amount of documents
necessary to have successful persecutions did not exist as they did after the end of World War 11.
The architects and leaders of the apartheid regime were very careful to destroy as much incrimi-
nating evidence as they could when they realized the conflict would not end with their victory.
Unfortunately, this is not an uncommon occurrence in transitional societies. See HAYNER, supra
note 4, at 227.
41 For the list of all Nobel Peace Prize winners, see All Nobel Peace Prizes, NOBELPRIZE.ORG,
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/ (last visited February 20, 2012).
42 I recognize that including Mandela in this list is problematic considering his role as the
leader of the armed wing of the African National Congress. However, his worldwide legacy is not
his role leading violent revolt but his pursuit of forgiveness and reconciliation, rather than revenge
and further alienation, after the end of the Apartheid regime.
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TRC in South Africa's legacy of nonviolence as a legal-political extension of
those movements, South Africa arguably becomes the country from which more
important developments in nonviolent social change have come than any other.
The political culture of South Africa, from at least the first of Gandhi's protests
at the turn of the twentieth century to the completion of the TRC at the end of
the twentieth century, has been dramatically shaped by the principled commit-
ments of nonviolent social activists. For all of these reasons, it is quite appropri-
ate to use South Africa as a case study in the political institutionalization of
those commitments.
2. Why Desmond Tutu?
During his public career opposing apartheid, Desmond Tutu was a sem-
inary professor,4 3 parish priest, leader of the South African Council of Churches
("SACC"),44 and Archbishop of the Anglican Church in South Africa. 45 In these
roles he was a leading religious voice calling on all people to work towards
peaceful social change, reconciliation, and justice. His protests stood out from
many others because of his insistence that the appropriate method for achieving
such change was nonviolent protests and civil disobedience. Though recogniz-
ing the evils of Apartheid as comparable to those of Nazi Germany,46 he never
advocated violent revolt. Tutu's protests were very influential domestically and
internationally, and because of this, Nelson Mandela named him "public enemy
number one to the powers-that-be" 47 in the 1980s. In addition, upon establishing
the TRC, Mandela appointed Tutu to be its chairperson. Throughout all of this,
Tutu provided philosophical-theological justifications for both nonviolent pro-
test and the TRC, against a multitude of critics. These arguments remained con-
sistent and are intimately linked. Because of his high profile, his experience in
both Apartheid and post-Apartheid South Africa, his nuanced philosophical-
theological commitments, and his willingness to present them to the public in an
accessible way, Tutu is a good case study for examining the relationship of the
principles that undergird both nonviolent social action and the pursuit of recon-
ciliation in post-conflict societies, specifically the use of TRCs.
3. Tutu's Opposition to Apartheid: Political Priest
There are three stories that occurred early in Tutu's career that are rep-
resentative of his leadership roles as political priest and public prophet in the
43 See JOHN ALLEN, RABBLE-ROUSER FOR PEACE: THE AUTHORIZED BIOGRAPHY OF DESMOND
TUTU 105 (2006).
4 See id. at 167-74.
45 See id. at 263-72.
46 See TUTU, supra note 8, at 58.
47 ALLEN, supra note 43, at 79.
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opposition to apartheid. The first comes from his time as a seminary professor.
On September 6, 1968, during a protest over the suspension of 300 students for
political protests, police arrived at Federal Theological Seminary of South Afri-
ca with dogs and tear gas. 48 A future Anglican priest, Barney Pityana, remem-
bered Tutu's intervention in the situation in this way:
"We had been surrounded by police, with dogs snarling at us.
We were petrified, for nearly two hours. Some people were cry-
ing . . . The staff of the university, the white people-some of
them armed-these professors were watching and nobody said a
word, nobody ... Desmond [came] almost from nowhere, in a
cassock ... broke the police cordon and came to be among us. I
recall moving scenes of young women kneeling to pray with
Desmond for blessings. Even today when I recall that I get very
emotional. For me that was the greatest example I could think
of, of what to be a priest was all about." 49
Pityana's reflection is not an uncommon one for many who lived through the
apartheid era. Tutu became a symbolic figure of the power of religion, especial-
ly Christianity, to both inspire nonviolent public action (in this instance, prayer
in the face of impending violence) and to maintain the moral authority common-
ly associated with the Church. He often used this moral authority, as in the story
above, to diffuse volatile, and potentially violent, situations through simple non-
violent means like prayer, song, or sermons. This symbolic role as the embodi-
ment of the moral authority granted by religion was one he maintained even
after the end of apartheid.50 As his public profile grew, there were multiple other
occasions when Tutu placed himself in the middle of a confrontation between
51protestors and police and acted as a mediating and calming presence.
4. Tutu's Opposition to Apartheid: Public Prophet
In addition to being a political priest, Tutu was also a public prophet.
His words and actions often challenged the status quo in South Africa and often
carried more import than they would appear to carry by a surface reading. He
48 See id. at 111.
49 Id.
50 See ANTJIE KROG, COUNTRY OF MY SKULL: GUILT, SORROW, AND THE LIMITS OF
FORGIVENESS IN THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA 201-10 (1998) (providing a string of similar stories that
demonstrate Tutu's ability to use his moral authority to diffuse a potentially violent situation
nonviolently). Krog also claims that the functioning of the TRC would have been "unthinkable"
and "impossible" without his presence on the TRC because he was its moral "compass." See id at
201. See also ALEX BORAINE, A COUNTY UNMASKED: INSIDE SOUTH AFRICA'S TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 268-69 (2000) (highlighting the TRC's co-chairperson's claim that
Tutu's person was necessary for the success of the TRC).
51 See, e.g., KROG, supra note 50, at 206-07.
9792012]
11
McCarty: Nonviolent Law? Linking Nonviolent Social Change and Truth and Re
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2012
WEST VIRGINIA LA WREVIEW
was the South African voice that was heard around the world in a way other
voices were not heard, and this gave him the ability to make symbolic protests
that carried great moral and political weight.
For instance, in March 1975 Tutu was appointed dean of St. Mary's Ca-
thedral, becoming the first black dean of a white congregation in South Africa.52
As part of this appointment he was granted permission, contrary to the Group
Areas Act, 53 to live in the white suburb the church was located in. He refused,
however, to live there because he did not want to be treated like an "honorary
white" saying, "I do not want to apologise for my blackness."54 This action car-
ried great symbolic weight for many black South Africans. By proudly claiming
his blackness and standing in solidarity with the majority of South Africans,
Tutu symbolically undercut the power and allure of trading in political justice
for individual material success.
It was not only Tutu's actions that were prophetic and public, but it was
also often his words that changed public opinion and directly challenged apart-
heid. For instance, on May 6, 1976, Tutu wrote an open letter" to Prime Minis-
ter Vorster warning that if the government did not participate in a just and
peaceful program of social change, violence was likely to erupt. Six weeks later,
the Soweto uprising occurred, in which 140 students were killed by the police
during a nonviolent protest march, and people looked back at Tutu's letter as a
profoundly prophetic piece. 5 6 This public letter, in which he warned the gov-
ernment and made concrete suggestions to move forward peacefully, was the
first of several such public letters Tutu wrote. It was a form of social protest he
employed multiple times in his career.
Tutu continued, until the election of Nelson Mandela in 1994, to play
the role of public prophet and political priest. He led protest marches, called for
international economic boycotts of the apartheid government and South African
businesses, became the first black Archbishop in the Anglican Church, called on
the government to act justly and peacefully, and became a spokesman to the
world on behalf of black South Africans. It is appropriate then that after apart-
heid was dismantled and Mandela became president, Tutu was appointed
Chairman of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
52 ALLEN, supra note 43, at 145.
5 The Group Areas Act was a piece of apartheid legislation that "divided the entire country
into geographical areas based on race ... . Under this Act, the government could impose control
throughout the country over property rights requiring permits, based on race, for ownership and
occupation[, ... giving the government the power to 'proclaim' an area as fit for occupation by
one group and forcibly removing existing occupants from any other groups." NANCY L. CLARK &
WILLIAM H. WORGER, SOUTH AFRICA: THE RISE AND FALL OF APARTHEID 51 (2d ed. 2011). In
practice, this meant certain areas were legally designated for white residents only, and some for
black residents only.
54 ALLEN, supra note 43, at 145.
5 See TUTU, supra note 8, at 6-13.
56 See id. at 13.
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C. Tutu and the Foundations ofPrincipled Nonviolence
Desmond Tutu was one in a long line of activists to advocate nonviolent
social protest and civil disobedience as the preferred means for bringing about
social change in a situation of social injustice.57 Therefore, it is no surprise that,
while unique in their particularly South African expressions, the foundational
commitments that motivated and sustained his nonviolent social action are
commitments shared by most other advocates of nonviolent social action around
the world. In the following sections of the paper, I will highlight the most prom-
inent of these foundational commitments: namely, the interconnectedness of
human existence, the inherent human dignity that grounds human rights, the
"principle of transfiguration," the duty of civil disobedience in obedience to a
higher law, and a commitment to restorative justice.
1. Ubuntu (Interconnectedness)
The southern African concept of ubuntu was the foundation of all of
Desmond Tutu's thinking about nonviolence and reconciliation. Tutu's famous
"ubuntu theology" is Christian theology grounded in the South African con-
text.58 It is unashamedly so and, because it is explicitly "African" as opposed to
"Western," was embraced by many in the struggle against apartheid. Tutu often
created space in his writings and speeches to define ubuntu and its implications
as it was one of the guiding principles of his thought and social activism. 9 The
essence of ubuntu theology is the ontological and relational interconnectedness
of all persons.
Ubuntu is described by Tutu in this way:
In our African idiom we say: "A person is a person through
other persons." . . . The first law of our being is that we are set
in a delicate network of interdependence with our fellow human
beings and with the rest of God's creation. In Africa recogni-
tion of our interdependence is called ubuntu. . . . It is the es-
sence of being human. It speaks of the fact that my humanity is
caught up and inextricably bound up in yours. I am human be-
cause I belong. . . . A person with ubuntu is welcoming, hospi-
table, warm and generous, willing to share. . . . They know that
they are diminished when others are humiliated, diminished
when others are oppressed, diminished when others are treated
as if they were less than who they are. . . . When we Africans
want to give high praise to someone, we say, "Yu, u nobuntu":
5 See ACKERMAN & DUVALL, supra note 1, at 1-9.
58 See BATTLE, supra note 8, at 1.
5 See TUTU, supra note 9, at 31. See also TUTU, supra note 8, at 125 (multiple references to
ubuntu).
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"Hey, so-and-so has ubuntu." A person is a person because he
recognizes others as persons.60
Because of Tutu's deeply rooted belief in ubuntu, his goal in combating
apartheid was always reconciliation. He believed his humanity, and the humani-
ty of his fellow black South Africans, was intrinsically tied to the humanity of
white South Africans. They were dependent on each other to be truly human.
The metaphor of the family is one Tutu frequently used to demonstrate
the way whites and blacks were connected in South Africa.6 1 This metaphor had
special rhetorical power because the vast majority of the population claimed to
be Christians. 62 He said:
If we could but recognize our common humanity, that we do be-
long together, that our destinies are bound up with one anoth-
er's, that we can be free only together, that we can survive only
together, that we can be human only together, then a glorious
South Africa would come into being where all of us lived har-
moniously together as members of one family, the human fami-
ly, God's family. In truth a transfiguration would have taken
place.63
Tutu preached this message consistently, and his invitation was always the
same, "Come, join us, for when we are free, then all will be free. Until we are
all free none is going to be free."64
While the southern African concept of ubuntu provided Tutu with an
especially powerful philosophical anthropology from which to work, he was not
the first advocate of nonviolence to appeal to human interconnectedness as a
foundation for nonviolent action.6 5 Human interconnectedness and interdepend-
60 DESMOND TUTU, GOD HAS A DREAM: A VISION OF HOPE FOR OUR TIME 25-26 (2004).
61 See BATTLE, supra note 8, at 8.
62 See TUTU, supra note 8, at 119.
You don't choose your family. They are God's gift to you, as you are to them.
Perhaps if we could, we might have chosen different brothers and sisters. For-
tunately or unfortunately we can't. We have them as they have us. And no
matter how your brother may be, you can't renounce him. He may be a mur-
derer or worse, but he remains forever your brother. Our baptism has made us
brothers and sisters. Can you imagine what would happen in this land if we
accepted that theological fact about ourselves-that whether we like it or not
we are members of one family?
Id.
63 Id. at 121.
6 Id. at 202.
65 For instance, Martin Luther King, Jr. often appealed to the global interdependence of all
humans as one of the reasons that war is an unthinkable option for creating peace. King was con-
vinced that all of humanity is interconnected and the idea permeates his speeches and writings.
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ence are foundational philosophical-theological commitments of many princi-
pled advocates of nonviolent social change. 6 They insist that our ontological
connection and dependence to one another makes violence an option that never
does more good than harm. To do violence to another is to do violence to one-
self and one's community, they claim, and therefore cannot be a tool in bringing
about reconciliation, peace, or a sustainable justice. The nature of violence is to
beget more violence. This cycle of violence is harmful to all because our inter-
dependence means we are all injured with each new round of violence, whether
we are those perpetrating the violence or receiving the violence.
Principled nonviolence, then, rests upon the recognition that when we
injure others, we injure ourselves. Within an ubuntu framework, when we ex-
clude others from just, peaceable, and loving relationships we actually cut our-
selves off from our full humanity. In other words, to do violence to another is to
harm all of humanity, including oneself, ontologically and relationally. Within
this understanding of the nature of human beings in the world, violence ceases
to be a viable option. The interdependence and interconnectedness of all people
requires that one choose nonviolence whenever possible.
One fruit of the tree of ubuntu and interdependence is a special aware-
ness that what one fights when engaging in nonviolent social protest is not nec-
essarily "evil individuals" or "others" but rather unjust social and political sys-
67tems. If one believes that the primary evil one is fighting is not grounded in
any individual but in the political arrangements and structures of a society, it
makes little or no sense to injure other persons who are negatively affected by
those systems as well even if they are affected in a different way than the op-
pressed.6 8 Those who benefit from unjust social and political systems are nega-
tively affected-in fact, their humanity is diminished-by their participation in
For example, in his famous "Letter from a Birmingham Jail," King said, "Injustice anywhere is a
threat to justice everywhere. We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a sin-
gle garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly." MARTIN LUTHER
KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 65 (2000).
This ontological truth informed his understanding of why injustice was so evil and why he should
respond to such evil and injustice with love and nonviolence. Injustice is evil and should be op-
posed because it injures all of humanity. Likewise, it should be opposed nonviolently because
even those actions affect all of humanity. See id.
One of the most well-known non-Christian principled advocates of nonviolence is Vietnamese
Buddhist monk Thich Nhat Hanh. Like Tutu and King, he has a deep appreciation for the inter-
connectedness of humanity. One of his most famous expressions of this truth is his poem "Please
Call Me By My True Names." See THICH NHAT HANH, BEING PEACE 83-85 (2d ed. 1996).
So, principled advocates of nonviolence across time, continent, and religion have appealed to
human interconnectedness as a foundation for their nonviolent activism.
66 See HANH, supra note 65, at 83-85; MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., supra note 65, at 65.
67 See A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER
KING, JR. 12-13 (James M. Washington ed., 1986).
68 See MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., STRENGTH TO LOVE 53 (1981). See also TUTU, supra note 9,
at 103.
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those systems. 69 By learning to hate and oppress they become malformed peo-
ple; they are people in need of healing and redemption rather than punishment.
2. Human Dignity
The sister core belief of ubuntu's emphasis on interconnectedness is the
fact that all humans have an inherent dignity; 70 theologically, Tutu consistently
spoke of all people as being created in the "image of God."7 This is why apart-
heid was so evil; it denied that blacks have the same amount of dignity-bear
God's image equally-as whites.
The Bible declares right at the beginning that human beings are
created in the image and likeness of God. I showed [earlier in
the speech] why this fact endows each person with a unique and
infinite value, a person whose very hairs are numbered. And
what makes any human being valuable therefore is not any bio-
logical characteristic. No, it is the fact that he or she is created
in the image of and likeness of God.72
The message that all people are created in the image of God was a
common message that Tutu delivered to whites. In his first public letter to Prime
Minister Vorster, just weeks before the Soweto uprising in 1976, he wrote, "I
am writing to you as one human person to another human person, gloriously
created in the image of the selfsame God . . .. He continued proclaiming this
message to white audiences throughout the struggle against apartheid so that in
1992, two years before Mandela's election, he was still saying, "I hope some-
where, somehow it will sink into the consciousness of most of our white fellow
South Africans that we are human beings. Just a simple thing: we are human
69 See MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., supra note 68, at 53. See also TUTU, supra note 9, at 103.
70 See BATTLE, supra note 58, at 35-53.
71 See id. at 58. It is important to note that while Tutu's "grounding" of human rights is an
explicitly Christian theological conviction, this does not exclude non-Christians from embracing
the dignity of all people. There is a growing literature on the grounding/source of the inherent
dignity that human rights are said to be based upon. While there are some, like Michael Perry,
who argue that human rights are inherently religious, many others believe that there are secular
grounds for human dignity as well. I side with Richard Amesbury and others in claiming that there
can be multiple grounds for human rights that move across cultural and religious traditions. See
MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR INQUIRIES 11-41 (1998). See also Richard
Amesbury, Universal Human Rights and Religious Particularity, in THE GOD OF LOVE AND
HUMAN DIGNITY 65-83 (Paul Middleton ed., 2007). See generally GRACE Y. KAO, GROUNDING
HUMAN RIGHTS IN A PLURALIST WORLD (2011).
72 TUTU, supra note 8, at 64.
73 Id.at7.
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beings. . . . Our cry is for you to recognize that God has created us as God has
created you." 7 4
Tutu believed that humans carry the image of God with them so deeply
that he considered it blasphemy to treat people without dignity and respect.75
The inherent human dignity of all persons is so important, claimed Tutu, that
violating it is analogous to desecrating a holy place.7 6 Oppression, injustice,
racism, and violence are sins-in a social and religious sense-because they do
harm to those created in God's image. If this is true, if all people have inherent
dignity, the use of violence is a violation of that dignity. Part of what having
dignity means, according to many principled nonviolence advocates, is that vio-
lating the bodily integrity of another is a violation of that dignity.
What are the implications of this conviction? First, the oppression and
social injustice present in societies like Apartheid South Africa is so incredibly
wrong that the society must be transformed. Simple reformation will not suffice;
revolution is required. Second, this revolution must be nonviolent because it is
not only the poor and oppressed or one's political allies who carry this dignity.
One's political enemies and oppressors also carry this inherent dignity and vio-
lence done to them violates their dignity just as the violence done to the poor
and oppressed (explicit and systemic) is a violation of their dignity.
3. The Principle of Transfiguration (Responsible Hope)
Another key foundation of Tutu's advocacy of nonviolence is the "prin-
ciple of transfiguration." The "principle of transfiguration" is simply a belief
that no person or situation is unredeemable.n Everything can be transformed.
Tutu's belief in the principle of transfiguration has found expression in his anti-
apartheid work, his emphasis on reconciliation, and his work with the TRC.
For Tutu, this belief was central to his understanding of the universe.
Tutu described the principle of transfiguration as such:
74 Id. at 246.
7 TUTU, supra note 60, at 63.
To treat a child of God as if he or she were less than this is not just wrong,
which it is; it is not just evil, as it often is; not just painful, as it often must be
for the victim; it is veritably blasphemous, for it is to spit in the face of God.
Each of us is a "God carrier," as St. Paul put it. Human beings must not just
by rights be respected, but they must be held in awe and reverence.
Id.
76 See id.
n Technically, Tutu is an adherent of Just War Theory. However, he never advocated the use
of violence in South Africa even though he equated Apartheid South Africa with Nazi Germany,
of which he believed military intervention was justified. TuTu, supra note 8, at 142. I believe this
seeming contradiction can be traced back to his belief in the principle of transfiguration. He never
believed the situation in South Africa had reached the "last resort" of violence, which is one of the
key criterion of Just War Theory.
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The principle of transfiguration says nothing, no one and no sit-
uation is "untransfigurable," that the very creation, nature, waits
expectantly for its transfiguration when it will be released from
its bondage and share in the glorious liberty of the children of
God, when it will not be just dry inert matter but will be trans-
lucent with a divine glory. The principle of transfiguration avers
that an erstwhile persecutor can become the greatest missionary
of the truth he once persecuted, that one who denied his Master
not once but three times could become the prince of apostles
proclaiming boldly faith in a Jesus Christ when only a short
while before he was cowering in abject fear behind locked
doors. It is the principle of transfiguration at work when an in-
strument of the most painful and shameful death can become
the life-giving Cross which Christians wear with pride and
which is traced over them at significant moments in their life . .
God calls on us to be his fellow workers. He wants to enlist our
support to be his agents of transfiguration, of transformation ...
... He enlists us to help him transfigure all the ugliness of this
world into the beauty of his kingdom. 78
Advocates of nonviolence are often accused of being na'ive, utopian
dreamers, and unrealistic about politics. 79 They continue to claim, however, that
they are more "realistic," meaning "effective" in bringing about social change 80
78 Id. at 121-22, 127. This passage is thick with Christian biblical references. Tutu references,
in quick succession, the Christian doctrine that God will one day redeem the universe and there
will be a "new creation," the conversion of the apostle Paul who went from being one of Christi-
anity's earliest opponents to its greatest missionary, the "comeback" of the apostle Peter who
denied knowing Jesus on the night of his crucifixion and became Christianity's first great preach-
er, and the resurrection of Jesus Christ who overcame the most hopeless of situations, death. Id.
7 The most famous and damning of such critics in Christian ethics comes from Reinhold Nie-
buhr. See REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY 56-58 (Westminster John
Knox Press, 2001) (1932); REINHOLD NIEBUHR, Love and Justice and the Pacifist Issue, in LOVE
AND JUSTICE: SELECTIONS FROM THE SHORTER WRITINGS OF REINHOLD NIEBUHR 241-301(D.B.
Robertson ed., 1957); Reinhold Niebuhr, Why the Christian Church is not Pacifist, in THE
ESSENTIAL REINHOLD NIEBUHR: SELECTED ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 102 (Robert McAfee Brown
ed., 1986).
s0 Erica Chenoweth & Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of
Nonviolent Conflict, INT'L SEC, Summer 2008, at 8. Chenoweth and Stephan demonstrate that
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than those who dismiss nonviolence as ineffective or naYve because of the his-
toric and philosophical power of nonviolent tactics of social change. For in-
stance, long-time peace activist John Dear has reminded us that folksinger Pete
Seeger often answers those who question the efficacy of nonviolence by asking
the following set of questions:
In the early 1970s . . . did you ever expect to see President Nix-
on resign because of Watergate? . . . Did you ever expect to see
the Pentagon leave Vietnam the way it did? . . . In the 1980s,
did you expect to see the Berlin Wall come down so peacefully?
... In the 1990s, did you expect to see Nelson Mandela released
from prison, apartheid abolished, and Mandela become Presi-
dent of South Africa? . . . Did you ever expect the two warring
sides of Northern Ireland to sign a peace agreement on Good
Friday?"
We may add, "Did you ever think you would see a string of Arab dictators, in-
cluding Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, be removed from power through peaceful
means?" The answer to each of these questions is always a resounding "No!"
"'If you can't predict those things,' Pete concludes, 'don't be so confident that
there's no hope! There's always hope!"' 82 The point, of course, is that people
frequently claim that certain social and political changes are impossible through
nonviolent means until, of course, those changes actually come about in large
part because of nonviolent means.83 Dear and Seeger call the desire for such
changes to occur again in the future "hope." Tutu agrees with that sentiment. He
is often quoted claiming something along the lines of, "I'm not an optimist, I'm
a prisoner of hope!"8 4
This distinction is not unlike the "responsible hope"85 advocated by eth-
icist and pacifist Ellen Ott Marshall. Responsible hope is a tenacious grasping
between 1900 and 2006 nonviolent resistance campaigns have succeeded, partially or wholly, at a
rate double that of violent resistance campaigns. Id.
81 JOHN DEAR, PUT DowN YOUR SWORD: ANSWERING THE GOSPEL CALL To NONVIOLENCE 187-
88 (2008).
82 Id.
83 Chenoweth and Stephan, supra note 80, at 8. "Our findings show that major nonviolent
campaigns have achieved success 53 percent of the time, compared with 26 percent for violent
resistance campaigns." Id.
84 See David Frost, End of Apartheid, BBC NEWS, (May 29, 2005),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/breakfast withfrost/4591113.stm (last visited Feb. 13,
2012). See also Steve Maynard, Nobel Peace Prize laureate Desmond Tutu a "prisoner of hope,"
TACOMA NEWS TRIBUNE, (May 13, 2011)
http://www.thenewstribune.com/2011/05/13/1663395/news-brief-13tutup4.html (last visited Feb.
13, 2012).
85 ELLEN OTT MARSHALL, THOUGH THE FIG TREE DOES NOT BLOSSOM: TOWARD A
RESPONSIBLE THEOLOGY OF HOPE, at xiv (2006). Responsible hope
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onto a more just future while remaining grounded in the often despair-producing
realities of social injustice and oppression.8 Responsible hope takes the "long-
view" of history and places its faith in peace and justice rather than violence and
division. It is an approach to social change that trusts "relational power"87 rather
than hierarchical power or the power of the sword. It is a hope that is not sur-
prised when these things actually triumph as they were wont to do in the twenti-
eth century, but it does not necessarily expect to see its goals reached in one
lifetime. Philip McManus and Gerald Schlabach remind us that nonviolent
movements are often defined by this same attitude, which they call "relentless
persistence."88 Whatever you call it-the principle of transfiguration, responsi-
ble hope, or relentless persistence-this attitude permeates principled nonviolent
movements for social change.
The belief that no person or situation is beyond transformation later led
Tutu to defend amnesty from criminal prosecutions for those who testified be-
fore the TRC. He did this because he believed that any individual ready to con-
fess their sins was ripe for transfiguration, and whatever horrible situation they
described could be transfigured into reconciled community. Speaking of the
theological underpinnings of the TRC Tutu said:
Theology reminded me that, however diabolical the act, it did
not turn the perpetrator into a demon . . . Theology said they
still, despite the awfulness of their deeds, remained children of
God with the capacity to repent, to be able to change....
... [W]e can never give up on anyone because our God was one
who had a particularly soft spot for sinners....
. . . None of us could in my theology ever consign anyone to
hell as ultimately irredeemable....
is a disposition that remains accountable to promise and peril. It unearths
beauty and faces tragedy. It celebrates goodness and knows cruelty. It buoys
the spirit and steels the spine . . . responsible hope remains accountable to the
hopes of others and labors to identify common goods rather than pursuing
self-interest . .. remains open to wonder and takes joy in mysterious and un-
reasonable good fortune, but it does not rely on them . .. A responsible hope
takes root in a relational concept of power, insisting that human effort is re-
quired to realize the possible.
Id.
86 Id.
8 Id.
88 RELENTLESS PERSISTENCE: NONVIOLENT ACTION IN LATIN AMERICA (Philip McManus &
Gerald Schlabach eds., 1991).
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. . . Ultimately no one is an irredeemable cause devoid of all
hope. No situation in this theology is irredeemable and devoid
of hope.
God does not give up on anyone. .. .8
4. Civil Disobedience
Part of the call of Christians, according to Tutu, is to partner with God
in bringing about transfiguration; 90 in the South African context that meant civil
disobedience to apartheid laws.91 Tutu said very bluntly, "Our marching orders
come from Christ himself and not from any human being . . . . When laws are
unjust then Christian tradition teaches that they do not oblige obedience."92 On
another occasion Tutu said, "This book [the Bible] says when a ruler gives you
unjust laws, disobey. You are not disobeying the ruler, you are obeying God ...
[T]he church says, an unjust law does not oblige obedience."9 In other words,
"not to oppose injustice is to disobey God." 94
Civil disobedience and non-violent direct action are righteous, for Tutu,
because they follow the example of Jesus.95 It is the call of all Christians to dis-
obey laws that are unjust because Christians "obey God rather than man." 9 6
This core belief found expression in Tutu's life when he led protest marches,
intervened in police actions, and encouraged economic sanctions of South Afri-
ca. He consistently called on people to defy the government in any creative and
peaceful way they could.
While Tutu primarily grounded his defense of civil disobedience in the
biblical narrative, many other advocates of nonviolence ground their civil diso-
bedience in some version of natural law, higher law, or the nature of the uni-
verse. For instance, Martin Luther King, Jr. insisted that he was on the side of
the universe when he participated in nonviolent civil disobedience because "the
arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice." 97 Nonviolent so-
cial action often has, whether it is the divine command of Tutu or the metaphys-
89 TUTU, supra note 9, at 83-87.
90 See supra text accompanying note 78.
9' See Joel A. Nichols & James W. McCarty III, When the State is Evil: Biblical Civil
(Dis)Obedience in South Africa, 85 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 593, 593-625 (2011).
92 TUTU, supra note 8, at 150-51.
9 Id. at 171.
94 TUTU, supra note 60, at 63.
9 Nichols & McCarty, supra note 91, at 619.
96 TUTU, supra note 8, at 171.
9 MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., The Current Crisis in Race Relations, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE,
supra note 67, at 85, 88. "[N]onviolent resistance ... is based on the conviction that the universe
is on the side of justice . . . in his [the non-violent resister's] struggle for justice he has cosmic
companionship."
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ical reality of King and others, some justification of civil disobedience that is
grounded in a higher notion ofjustice than positive law.
5. Restorative Justice
Restorative justice is an alternative approach to criminal justice. Rather
than accepting the primarily retributive approaches practiced in modern nation-
states, restorative practices move beyond the primarily liberal and Western as-
sumptions that undergird these practices and claim that justice may be better
met by "restoration" of goods and relationships than by inflicting physical pun-
ishment by confinement or death. Put simply, restorative justice seeks to re-
frame the conversation of criminal justice in such a way that the contextual
needs of victims are taken more seriously and the nature of crime is understood
primarily as a violation of persons and relationships rather than as primarily
against the state or an abstract notion of universal justice. Justice, then, is the
restoration of violated individuals and relationships. 9 8
All of the previous themes-ubuntu, human dignity, targeting systems
rather than individuals, transfiguration and hope, and a "higher" justice that jus-
tified civil disobedience-converged in Tutu's work with the Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission, which he understood as an exercise in national restorative
justice. In this capacity he played a key role in the transition from the apartheid
government to a multi-racial, democratic society. It was, at that point, a unique
experience in the history of the world.99
Describing restorative justice, Tutu says:
[P]erhaps justice fails to be done only if the concept we enter-
tain of justice is retributive justice, whose chief goal is to be
punitive, so that the wronged party is really the state, something
impersonal, which has little consideration for the real victims
and almost none for the perpetrator. We contend that there is
another kind of justice, restorative justice, which was character-
istic of traditional African jurisprudence. Here the central con-
98 See HOWARD ZEHR, CHANGING LENSES: A NEW Focus FOR CRIME AND PUNISHEMENT 177-
214 (3d ed. 2005); HOWARD ZEHR, THE LITTLE BOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 13-18 (2002). For
a wide range of essays on restorative justice, see generally CRITICAL ISSUES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
(Howard Zehr & Barb Toews, eds., 2004); HANDBOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE (Dennis Sullivan
& Larry Tift eds,. 2008) [hereinafter HANDBOOK 2008]; HANDBOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
(Gerry Johnstone & Daniel W. Van Ness eds., 2007) [hereinafter HANDBOOK 2007].
99 The first TRC, in name, was in Chile in 1990-1991, but the first TRC to take the promotion
of reconciliation seriously as a stated goal of the commission's work was South Africa's TRC
begun in 1995. See HAYNER, supra note 4, at 257. After the South African TRC, social and politi-
cal reconciliation (including forgiveness and healing) and restorative justice became important
goals-along with retributive justice, truth-finding, and democratization-to be considered in
transitional justice processes around the world. For example, since South Africa there have been at
least fourteen truth commissions that have included reconciliation in their name. Id. at 258-62.
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cern is not retribution or punishment. In the spirit of ubuntu, the
central concern is the healing of breaches, the redressing of im-
balances, the restoration of broken relationships, a seeking to
rehabilitate both the victim and the perpetrator, who should be
given the opportunity to be reintegrated into the community he
has injured by his offense. This is a far more personal approach,
regarding the offense as something that has happened to persons
and whose consequence is a rupture in relationships. Thus we
would claim that justice, restorative justice, is being served
when efforts are being made to work for healing, for forgiving,
and for reconciliation.'00
6. Linking Nonviolence and Restorative Justice in Tutu's Thought
Tutu's efforts at restorative justice on the national level reflect the cen-
tral tenets of his thought. In his work with the TRC he converted the external
expression of his beliefs from nonviolent social action to the legal-political
framework of the TRC. For instance, his insistence that humans are intercon-
nected, grounded in the concept of ubuntu, provided part of the foundation for
his rejection of violence.o'0 It also grounded his pursuit of restorative justice in
the TRC. Criminal offenses were not treated as primarily offenses against the
state. Rather, they were treated as violations against victims, and to do justice in
those situations was to restore the relationship, the connection, between victims
and offenders. If one begins with an ontology like the one implied by ubuntu
one, is likely to prefer restorative justice, when possible, over retributive jus-
-102tice.
Restorative justice is also related to a strong commitment to human dig-
nity. Whereas many people assume that the violation of human rights requires
prosecutions to do justice, restorative justice advocates insist that such proce-
dures are offender-centered and are more concerned with the rights of the state
being defended than the rights of the victim being restored. 0 3 In contrast, re-
storative justice mechanisms take the dignity of individual humans, especially
victims, so seriously that they make the restoration of victims' rights their cen-
tral concern.104 These rights are not understood in an abstract or universalized
way, however. Rather, they are contextualized in light of history, culture, the
individual needs of the victim, and the nature of the violation committed.
1oo Tu, No FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS, supra note 9, at 54-55.
101 See infra Part I.C.1.
102 Dirk J. Louw, The African Concept of Ubuntu and Restorative Justice, in HANDBOOK 2008,
supra note 98, at 161-73.
103 ZEHR, THE LITTLE BOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, supra note 98, at 20.
' Id. at 64-69.
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Like principled nonviolence, restorative justice mechanisms work under
the assumption that individuals and relationships can be restored or transfigured.
To work toward the redress of wrongs and the restoration of broken relation-
ships presumes, in a way that purely retributive practices do not, that such viola-
tions both can be restored and that it is a worthwhile endeavor to attempt to do
so. In this way, restorative justice mechanisms are more "hopeful," in a realistic
and responsible way, than retributive justice mechanisms.
Finally, like Tutu's justification of civil disobedience by appealing to a
higher form of justice than positive law, restorative justice refuses to accept
limits on criminal justice that exclude any other approach to redressing wrong-
doing other than punishment. The nature of justice is not limited to the prohibi-
tions or punishments prescribed by positive law. There are legitimate notions of
justice grounded in contextual considerations that can include compensation,
reparation, and even restoration. To limit criminal justice to retribution, restora-
tive justice advocates claim, is to constrain the doing of justice to a too narrow
mode of activity.
So, Desmond Tutu's philosophical-theological grounding for his nonvi-
olent activism grounded his commitment to pursuing reconciliation through the
TRC as well. These convictions were: the interconnectedness and interdepend-
ence of all people (articulately developed as ubuntu in his particular context),
the ethical demands of inherent human dignity, the implication of both of these
convictions on the treatment of one's enemies and/or oppressors, the justifica-
tion of civil disobedience grounded in a concept of justice higher than positive
law, and a persistent hope in the future and the possibility of individual and so-
cial change towards justice. These foundations for nonviolence ultimately found
expression in Tutu's work with the TRC and its pursuit of national restorative
justice. Restorative justice practices, then, can be an attempt to institutionalize
the principles of nonviolence in the legal justice system.
II. TRCs AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF NONVIOLENT DEMOCRATIC
PRACTICE
In recent years TRCs have become a regular tool for transitional socie-
tiestos needing to address past injustices and lay the foundation for and give
birth to a new society with cultural norms and institutions that support human
rights, political equality, and social justice.106 The most famous of these has
been the South African TRC,10 7 but they have recently been implemented in
1os Teitel describes the regular use of TRCs and the creation of the International Criminal Court
as the "normalization of transitional jurisprudence." See Teitel, supra note 5, at 89-92.
106 See HAYNER, supra note 4.
107 See Infra Part I.B.
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Sierra Leone, Liberia, Rwanda, Timor-Leste, and Greensboro, North Caroli-
na, 08 to name a few.' 09
TRCs are a remarkable first step in the attempt to construct a just socie-
ty and a reconciled citizenry within the boundaries of countries that were often
characterized by extreme social and economic injustice, gross violations of hu-
man rights, and governmental and revolutionary violence on a mass scale. Peo-
ple who were once enemies are expected to be partners in the construction of a
new society. Perhaps even more difficult, murderers are expected to be neigh-
bors with the families of those they murdered, and crooked politicians are ex-
pected to be equal citizens with those they oppressed for so long. In the modem
world, where civil wars and conflicts often come to an end through a peace
agreement rather than military coup or victory, the question of how to move
beyond past conflicts to recreate, or create for the first time, a relatively just
society is a vital one. For several countries, TRCs have been a pivotal part of the
answer." 0
A. Institutionalizing Democracy, Justice, Truth-telling, and Reconciliation
In this Part, I will delineate the ways in which TRCs contribute to the
construction of the foundation for a just and reconciled society in the wake of an
evil one. TRCs attempt to do this by reconstituting a society's social imaginary
through a retelling of its history, conceiving of justice in restorative and partici-
patory rather than purely retributive and distributive ways, and institutionalizing
practices of truth-telling, democratic participation, forgiveness, and reconcilia-
tion.
In the case of South Africa, the TRC's attempt to institutionalize these
practices can be viewed as growing out of the same foundational principles that
sustained the nonviolent social action that was part of bringing about social
change in the first place. Critics of TRCs in general, and the South African TRC
in particular, overlook this important connection. My goal, then, is to theorize
108 The Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission was a civil society initiative tasked
"to examine the 'context, causes, sequence and consequences,' and to make recommendations for
community healing around the tragedy in Greensboro, N.C., on Nov. 3, 1979, which resulted in
the deaths of five anti-Klan demonstrators: Cdsar Vicente Cauce, 25; Michael Ronald Nathan,
M.D., 32; William Evan Sampson, 31; Sandra Neely Smith, 28; and James Michael Waller, M.D.,
36; and the wounding of demonstrators Paul Bermanzohn, Claire Butler, Tom Clark, Nelson John-
son, Rand Manzella, Don Pelles, Frankie Powell, Jim Wrenn; Klansman Harold Flowers, and
news photographer David Dalton." GREENSBORO TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, at 2, available at
http://www.greensborotrc.org/exec summary.pdf
109 For a list of every truth commission to date through 2010, see HAYNER, supra note 4, at
256-62.
110 After South Africa, TRCs have been held in Peru, the former Yugoslavia, Timor-Leste,
Sierra Leone, Morocco, Greensboro, North Carolina, Democratic Republic of the Congo, South
Korea, Liberia, Solomon Islands, Togo, Canada, and Kenya. See id. at 258-62.
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TRCs, drawing at times on the South African TRC, as a legal-political mecha-
nism capable of continuing the institutionalization of those values that undergird
principled nonviolent action. I will do this by briefly theorizing the ways in
which TRCs institutionalize democratic practices, embody robust notions of
justice, and remake social imaginaries in such a way as to lay the foundation for
reconciled societies. In this way, TRCs attend to the socially differentiated way
that persons and societies navigate their social and moral worlds."'
1. What are Institutions?
Social theorists have demonstrated that we live through institutions.11
Institutions are the established and expected patterns that permeate the different
spheres of our lives and determine the appropriate ways of being in the world."13
They are both the concrete ways we live our lives, and the meanings symbolized
in our material interactions with the world and others.114 Institutions are multi-
ple and they each have multiple, internal logics."'5 So, our actual practices and
the meaning we give them are always being negotiated.1 16
While constituting the types of organizations that are found in a society,
institutions are not to be equated with organizations." 7 Though institutions are a
vital part of any culture, they are not simply another name for culture popularly
understood." 8 An institution can be as varied as the use of the handshake when
II For an exposition of the ways that people navigate the multiple moral logics of a socially
differentiated world, see generally Steven M. Tipton, Social Differentiation and Moral Pluralism,
in MEANING AND MODERNITY: RELIGION, POLITY, AND SELF 15 (Richard Madsen et al. eds., 2002).
112 In my opinion, the two most compelling accounts of the ways in which we live through
institutions are Roger Friedland & Robert R. Alford, Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practic-
es, and Institutional Contradictions, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL
ANALYSIS 232-63 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991) and ROBERT N. BELLAH ET
AL, THE GOOD SOCIETY 3-16, 287-306 (1991).
113 Bellah et al. define institutions in this way: "[A]n institution is a pattern of expected action
of individuals or groups enforced by social sanctions . . . Institutions are normative patterns em-
bedded in an enforced by laws and mores (informal customs and practices)." BELLAH ET AL., su-
pra note 112, at 10-11. Friedland and Alford define institutions in this way:
[I]nstitutions . . . [are]simultaneously material and ideal, systems of signs and
symbols, rational and transrational. Institutions are supraorganizational pat-
terns of human activity by which individuals and organizations produce and
reproduce their material subsistence and organize time and space. They are al-
so symbolic systems, ways of ordering reality, and thereby rendering experi-
ence of time and space meaningful.
Friedland and Alford, supra note 112, at 243.
114 Id.
115 See Friedland & Alford, supra note 112, at 243; Tipton, supra note 111, at 15-40.
116 BELLAH ET AL., supra note 112, at 11.
" Id.
" Friedland & Alford, supra note 112, at 253.
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greeting someone in western cultures-which functions with the internal logics
of respect, courtesy and equality (or deference, depending on the situation)-or
the treatment of humans primarily as individuals, which denotes a logic of rights
like liberty and private property. "l9 In other words, institutions provide the lan-
guage, norms, and practices within which it is possible for humans to live a co-
herent life.
Institutions as a category are neutral since they can promote any virtue
or vice, but in practice they are not impartial. Institutions are inevitably mor-
al.12 0 In fact, institutions are the locations and ways in which morals are both
shaped and transformed.121 Understanding this is vital to properly understanding
the role of TRCs.
Institutions vary and are often contradictory. For example, Friedland
and Alford list the "capitalist market, bureaucratic state, democracy, nuclear
family, and Christian religion" as the "central institutions of the contemporary
capitalist West." 2 2 Therefore, social institutions are often in competition with
one another, and if one institution begins to win over another one its logic be-
gins to be applied in spheres not originally intended.12 3 The most prevalent way
this occurs today is the way in which the logic of the market economy, with its
measures of efficiency and rational choice defined as profit maximization, has
infiltrated other areas of life.124
2. TRCs and their Institutional Function
TRCs are attempts to begin the institutionalization of certain values and
practices in societies in which they did not exist. They give public justification
to the participation of all in the democratic life of the society through welcom-
ing testimonies from people from every geographic area, class status, religious
affiliation, and political commitment in a society. They practice the recognition
of the poorest and most vulnerable citizens of a society by giving preference to
their testimonies when writing the history of the country in the final report.
They encourage the virtue of truth-telling in societies where the truth has often
been denied through the use of amnesties and reparations.
The South African TRC also extended those values that sustained the
nonviolent portion of the movement for social change by institutionalizing them
in the legal and political life of the new country. It practiced the interconnected-
"9 Id. at 238. Paradoxically, the modem conception of the individual would not be possible
without the establishment of certain social institutions in the modem west.
120 BELLAH ETAL., supra note 112, at 288.
121 Id.
122 BELLAH ET AL., supra note 112; Friedland & Alford, supra note 112, at 232.
123 Tipton, supra note 111, at 31-40 (calling the moral logic of institutions "imperialistic").
124 See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY
(1983) for an account of the dangers of the logic of one sphere-though he does not couch it in
these terms-infiltrating another, and the way in which this happens with the sphere of money.
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ness of people by insisting that perpetrators testify of their crimes in the pres-
ence of their victims and having victims testify to the injuries they endured in
the presence of their perpetrators. It practiced the recognition of the inherent
dignity of all by making it possible for people from every ethnic background
and social sphere to participate in its processes. The South African TRC recog-
nized a higher form of justice than positive law by pursuing restorative justice
rather than simply retributive justice. In small and large ways, then, the South
African TRC attempted to institutionalize justice, democracy, nonviolence, and
reconciliation through their multiple processes.
One clear example of the ways in which TRCs are attempts to transform
the institutions of a society is seen in their use of amnesties and public testimo-
nies. Nations going through a transitional period are often fighting a "culture of
impunity."l25 In nations with cultures of impunity, lies, public denials of truths,
political secrecy, vigilantism and illegal and immoral quid pro quo-for in-
stance, denying one's knowledge of illegal events so that one will receive the
favor in the future-are institutions that people in power perpetuate. The South
African TRC, with its conditional amnesty, attempted to discredit and transform
a culture of impunity into one of transparency and truth-telling by making it
preferable for a perpetrator to tell the truth rather than cover-up or lie about their
human rights violations. No longer are people encouraged to "look the other
way" when gross injustices occur. Instead, people are now encouraged to de-
nounce such actions as immoral and impermissible in their society.
In similar ways, TRCs institutionalize democratic justice and reconcilia-
tion alongside truth-telling to lay the foundation for a new and different society.
For instance, the public testimonies of those black South Africans denied citi-
zenship rights under the apartheid regime were the first opportunity many per-
sons had to participate in the official public discourse of the country. They were
literally learning and performing, for the first time, the institutionalized practice
of officially recognized democratic discourse. In addition, the acceptance of
such voices in the public sphere helped begin to institutionalize the democratic
practice of every citizen listening to every other citizen's voice. Two important
goals of transitional societies are to institutionalize justice as recognitionl26 and
125 Dumisa B. Ntsebeza, The Uses of Truth Commissions: Lessons for the World, in TRUTH V.
JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS, supra note 10, at 158, 164-65 (explaining the
culture of impunity present in Apartheid South Africa).
126 Andr6 du Toit, The Moral Foundations of the South African TRC: Truth as Acknowledge-
ment and Justice as Recognition, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS,
supra note 10, at 122, 135-38. du Toit says:
We distinguish the specific sense of justice relevant in this context, that ofjus-
tice as recognition involved in the restoration of the human and civic dignity of
victims, from both that of criminal and retributive justice and that of social and
distributivejustice....
. .. [J]ustice as recognition: the justice involved in the respect for other persons
as equal sources of truth and bearers of rights. In practice, this requires a fun-
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participation 127 in order to make democracy and democratic discourse plausible.
TRCs are the transitional justice mechanisms most capable of doing this on a
large scale.12 8
Also, while the success of the South African TRC in achieving its goals
is debated,129 it is generally agreed that it was successful in symbolically em-
bodying the social reconciliation it sought to facilitate.130 In addition, there were
moments of reconciliation between individuals that served as paradigmatic ex-
amples of the possibilities for reconciliation in South Africa. Institutions func-
tion on both a symbolic and a material level,131 and the success or failure of a
given TRC on one level does not necessarily determine the success or failure of
a TRC on the other. Both James Gibson and Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm argue that
the South African TRC was moderately successful in its material pursuit of rec-
onciliation, democracy, and human rights, while Audrey Chapman, Hugo van
damentally different orientation to that of the criminal justice system in the
form of victim-centered public hearings....
... In this perspective, justice as recognition must then involve more than just
the abstract (Kantian) sense of moral respect, and is this further sense of justice
as recognition that requires the special remedies provided by truth commissions
as a means to transitional justice.
Id.
127 "Basic justice demands the establishment of minimum levels of participation in the life of
the human community for all persons. The ultimate injustice is for a person or group to be actively
treated or passively abandoned as if they were nonmembers of the human race." National Confer-
ence of Catholic Bishops, Economic Justice for all: Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Econ-
omy, no. 77, quoted in HOLLENBACH, supra note 18, at 82.
128 For more in-depth accounts of justice as recognition and deliberative democracy, see gener-
ally NANCY FRASER, JUSTICE INTERRUPTUS: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE "POSTSOCIALIST"
CONDITION (1997); NANCY FRASER & AXEL HONNETH, REDISTRIBUTION OR RECOGNITION? A
POLITICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL EXCHANGE (2003); IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY
(2000).
129 For generally "negative" accounts of the effectiveness of the South African TRC, see TRUTH
AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: DID THE TRC DELIVER? (Audrey R. Chapman & Hugo
van der Merwe, eds., 2008); RICHARD A. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
IN SOUTH AFRICA: LEGITIMIZING THE POST-APARTHEID STATE (2001). For a generally "positive"
account of the effectiveness of the South African TRC, see JAMES L. GIBSON, OVERCOMING
APARTHEID: CAN TRUTH RECONCILE A DIVIDED NATION? (2004). For a moderate account of the
effectiveness of the South African TRC and a more ambiguous account of the effectiveness of
truth commissions in general, see ERIC WIEBELHAUS-BRAHM, TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND
TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES: THE IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY (2010).
130 For instance, Audrey Chapman and Hugo van der Merwe provide a substantial critique of
nearly every part of the TRC process and its results. Hugo van der Merwe & Audrey R. Chapman,
Did the TRC Deliver?, in TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: DID THE TRC DELIVER?,
supra note 129, at 278-79. However, even they claim that it was generally successful on a sym-
bolic level. Id.
13' Friedland & Alford, supra note 112, at 248-53.
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der Merwe, and Richard Wilson disagree.13 2 However, nearly all of them agree
that it was successful at the symbolic level by paradigmatically encouraging
racial and political reconciliation. 3
Simply changing individuals or organizations would not be sufficient to
achieve these purposes. Institutions must be transformed for social change to
endure through political changes, economic growth and decline, and even gen-
erational shifts. It is not enough to change the hearts of individuals, as important
as this is, or that organizations make policy changes to limit injustices, as im-
portant as this is, to create lasting justice and peace if the social institutions in
which those individuals and organizations exist and function are not trans-
formed. Our institutions provide us with the language and practices that we live
our lives through. Even the most potentially virtuous person cannot achieve that
virtue if the institutions in which they live do not make the achievement of vir-
tue a possibility. For lasting social change to occur, institutions must be trans-
formed towards justice. TRCs can function as a legal-political mechanism capa-
ble of contributing to such a transformation.
3. Remaking the Social Imaginary
While the idea of institutions can be vague and in the "background" of
our consciousness, there is another realm of social understanding a step further
removed from our daily thoughts, but which has no less an influence over the
way we collectively interpret the world and our relationships within it. Philoso-
pher Charles Taylor has called this realm of understanding our "social imagi-
nary." 34 Every society has its own social imaginary, parts of it shared with a
wider culture-for instance, "Western," "African," or "Confucian"-and parts
of it unique to that society or culture.
Taylor states that social imaginaries are "the ways people imagine their
social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between
them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper
normative notions and images that underlie these expectations." 3 1 Social imag-
inaries are not philosophical theories or "high culture" musings.13 6 Rather, they
are the ways that ordinary people "imagine" their social surroundings, their rela-
tionships, and their place in the world. 13 Social imaginaries include understand-
ings of human nature, divine relations with the world, the march of history, what
it means to be a "people like us," whoever "us" may be, and the future of one's
132 See supra note 127.
1 See sources cited supra note 129.
134 See TAYLOR, supra note 16, at 23.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 24. However, he points out that oftentimes theory "trickles down" into the common
social imaginary. Id.
13 Id. at 23.
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society and the world. '3 According to Taylor, a given social imaginary "incor-
porates a sense of the normal expectations we have of each other, the kind of
common understanding that enables us to carry out the collective practices that
make up our social life." 3 9
The way we live life together is irrevocably linked with the way we im-
agine life together. In fact, they reconstitute and reinforce one another in a dia-
lectical back and forth.14 0 One imagines how things should or could be done and
acts appropriately. In acting, one's imagination is either confirmed or chal-
lenged, and one reimagines appropriately. The process of imagining our world
and our society is an ongoing process. The social imaginary is never fully
formed or static. The creation and maintenance of the social imaginary is a dy-
namic process that continually makes and remakes the world as we know it.141
Taylor carefully demonstrates the way in which the modern western so-
cial imaginary came to be and how it has changed the western world. Notions of
the modem individual, secular space and time, popular sovereignty and natural
rights, instrumental rationality, romantic love, scientific truth, and several other
driving "imaginations" now determine much of life in the west. Just a few cen-
turies ago these notions were either inconceivable or extremely radical; today
they are commonplace, even taken for granted. The sign that something has
entered the social imaginary is when it is no longer questioned or consciously
thought about. When something is taken as "just the way it is" or the way things
naturally are or "the way we've always done things" it has firmly established
itself in a people's social imaginary.
4. Globalization and Transnational Social Imaginaries
Generally speaking, the modern phenomenon of globalization is the
global exchange of goods, services, capital, resources and people across national
borders in an increasingly interdependent global, capitalist economy that has
real impacts on the economic, social and cultural lives of people around the
138 Id. Taylor explains:
I adopt the term imaginary (i) because my focus is on the way ordinary peo-
ple 'imagine' their social surroundings, and this is often not expressed in
theoretical terms, but is carried in images, stories, and legends. It is also the
case that (ii) theory is often the possession of a small minority, whereas what
is interesting in the social imaginary is that it is shared by large groups of
people, if not the whole society. Which leads to a third difference: (iii) the
social imaginary is that common understanding that makes possible common
practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy.
Id.
1' Id. at 24.
140 Id. at 25. "If the understanding makes the practice possible, it is also true that it is the prac-
tice that largely carries the understanding." Id.
141 Id. at 30.
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world. 142 One overlooked portion of the globalization process in this definition,
however, is the global exchange of ideas that accompanies the exchange of ma-
terial resources that drives the process. While Taylor makes it clear that there
are multiple modern social imaginaries,14 3 and that they look especially different
outside of the western context, there is still some intellectual cross-pollination
that occurs because of political, economic, cultural, and intellectual reasons.
Many globalized ideas are moral ones. The aforementioned notion of
restorative justice is one, universal human rights is another. These categories, to
make sense across cultures, are necessarily "thin."'" By this, I mean that they
are inherently robust moral notions that are talked about in generic ways so that
people across cultures can access their meaning. On the other hand, "thick"
moral language is embedded in a culture and its meanings. 145 A "thick" moral
concept is grounded in a society's social imaginary. It cannot be fully under-
stood or appreciated outside of its cultural context. For instance, as much as I
have tried to delineate the southern African concept of ubuntu in this paper, I
have failed to convey all of its meaning as understood within its original con-
text. The word is untranslatable in the West because the cultural context is so
different from its context of origin.
Both thick and thin moral language, then, can reinforce or contribute to
reinventing a society's social imaginary.146 For instance, the language of human
rights grew out of western traditions of Christianity, natural law, and individual
autonomy,14 7 but has become globalized in recent decades. People around the
142 See PAMELA K. BRUBAKER, GLOBALIZATION AT WHAT PRICE? ECONOMIC CHANGE AND
DAILY LIFE 21-30 (Revised ed. 2007); REBECCA TODD PETERS, IN SEARCH OF THE GOOD LIFE: THE
ETHICS OF GLOBALIZATION 35-39 (2004).
143 Taylor supra note 16, at 1-2.
'" For an in-depth analysis of thick and thin moral language and their function in a globalized
civil society, see MICHAEL WALZER, THICK AND THIN: MORAL ARGUMENT AT HOME AND ABROAD
1-19 (1994).
145 Id
146 It seems to me that Walzer would disagree with this claim. For him, moral language is al-
ways thick before it can become thin, and thin language is never fully translatable but must reso-
nate instead with already thick language present in a culture. While I am sympathetic to this
stance, I am not convinced that thin language can never be powerful enough to actually cross
culture and influence the social imaginary of a culture it was not bom in. For instance, it seems to
me that the language of human rights has transcended its original context and been translated
reasonably well in multiple other contexts, so that it has become thick in cultures where it was
originally thin. Another example, in my opinion, is the existence of multiple global religions-like
the various expressions of Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity and Islam-that have extended far
beyond their cultural birthplace and have had real influence around the world. While remaining
recognizably thinly "Buddhist," for example, no matter where Buddhism is practiced around the
world, Buddhism has also become thick in its various cultural settings. See id. at 4 (arguing
against moral language beginning as thin and becoming thick).
14 See generally CHRISTIANITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTRODUCTION (John Witte, Jr. &
Frank S. Alexander eds., 2010); LYNN HUNT, INVENTING HUMAN RIGHTS: A HISTORY (2007); JOHN
WITTE, JR., THE REFORMATION OF RIGHTS: LAW, RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN EARLY MODERN
CALVINISM (2007); NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, JUSTICE: RIGHTS AND WRONGS 19-132 (2008).
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world, often in nations that are in the midst of conflict or going through a politi-
cal transition, have used the language of human rights to justify political action
and revolution. To talk about violations of human rights resonates on every in-
habited continent on the earth. However, though there is some shared meaning
when this language is used, people in different places often mean quite different
things when using the same language.
In the United States, for example, appeals to human rights have tradi-
tionally meant that people have felt that their liberty has been violated. Usually
this violation is in the form of bodily harm or property violation. However, in
South Africa many people claimed their human rights were violated because
family members disappeared, and mothers, for instance, did not know where
their sons were buried. In the context of southern Africa, the right to bury and
properly memorialize one's family is of upmost importance. To the surprise of
many in the West, when asked what reparations would suffice for people who
had family killed, there were some who responded that simply knowing the truth
about what happened to their missing family, the location of their dead loved
ones, and being provided the resources to give them a proper burial were what
was required. 148 Activists around the world talk about human rights, but exactly
what they mean by that language is not always the same. However, whether in
thick or thin ways, that language can infiltrate and transform a society's social
imaginary.
TRCs, then, are attempts to transform a society's social imaginary.
They attempt to do this in two ways: by retelling the story of the nation's history
and birth and by institutionalizing a culture of democracy and human rights.
TRCs are usually a tool used in countries emerging out of some colonial or es-
pecially oppressive political context. In these contexts, the history of the indige-
nous people has often been suppressed, denied, or erased, and new national
myths were institutionalized during the oppressive regime.'49 For example,
Apartheid South Africa's social imaginary included a story that the land that
makes up modern South Africa was a divine gift and blessing upon the Afrikan-
er people, a biblically grounded racial hierarchy,so and a political culture that
148 For example, see TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT, § 2-
6, at 129-31 (March 21, 2003), available at http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/2003/trc. See also
the testimony of Nomsa Monica Mathe, available at
http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/hrvtrans/hrvnel/mathe.htm.
149 1 draw my use of national myths from Richard T. Hughes, who wrote:
[A] myth is a story that speaks of meaning and purpose, and for that reason it
speaks truth to those who take it seriously ... Our national myths, then, are the
stories that explain why we love our country and why we have faith in the na-
tion's purposes. Put another way, our national myths are the means by which
we affirm the meaning of [the country we live in].
RICHARD T. HUGHES, MYTHS AMERICA LIVES BY 2 (2004).
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recognized an elite minority as the only legitimate citizens of the modem state
of South Africa. Their social imaginary provided a people's identity that could
not be extracted from religion, race, ethnicity, or history.
In this context, in which the narrative of the birth of the country and its
foundations excluded and marginalized the majority of the population, a new
story needed to be told and a new social imaginary made. The South African
TRC began this process by retelling the history of South Africa as a country
birthed in racial domination, ethnic division, religious hypocrisy, and political
subjugation, but one in which such dominant forces were overcome by racial
solidarity, democratic political activism, the martyrdom of those fighting for
justice for future generations, and charismatic leaders like Nelson Mandela and
Desmond Tutu.15' The TRC provided a new South African identity-a new so-
cial imaginary-in which those who are most important are those who practice
forgiveness, reconciliation, and struggle mightily to establish justice. A new
social imaginary cannot be created in the few short years in which TRCs are
mandated to work, but they are the first step in their creation by telling a new
founding story that emphasizes new values of democracy, human rights, social
justice, and reconciliation.15 2
TRCs also attempt to create a new social imaginary by introducing new
moral language into a society. In a similar way in which speaking of the prima-
15o For accounts of the way in which Christian theology and biblical religion informed the
social imaginary of Apartheid South Africa, see J.A. LOUBSER, A CRITICAL REVIEW OF RACIAL
THEOLOGY IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE APARTHEID BIBLE (1987); SAMUEL A. PAUL, THE UBUNTU GOD:
DECONSTRUCTING A SOUTH AFRICAN NARRATIVE OF OPPRESSION 13-57 (2009).
'5' Another telling example of the way in which TRCs attempt to reshape social imaginaries by
retelling history is the Greensboro, North Carolina, TRC. Popular depictions of the "Greensboro
Massacre" have tended to blame both the Ku Klux Klan and the Communist Workers' Party for
the violence that occurred on November 3, 1979. The role of the Greensboro Police in the incident
has generally been ignored. However, the TRC's final report demonstrates rather convincingly
that the police are partly responsible for the level of violence reached that day and shows that
there has been a pattern of racially motivated negligence in protecting poor blacks in Greensboro's
history. This telling of the story has affected and reshaped the story Greensboro residents have
long told themselves about being "better" on race relations than the rest of the American south.
152 Another way to say this is that TRCs are what Andr6 du Toit has termed "historical found-
ing projects." du Toit says,
They are historical founding projects in the transitional context of introducing
and consolidating a new democratic dispensation and/or a culture of rights and
accountability following massive violations of human rights under the prior
regime. They are best understood as responses to the special moral and politi-
cal needs of this kind of historical context; that is, those arising from attempts
to found a new democratic order in the aftermath of the political atrocities
and/or social injustices of a prior regime. . . . As historical founding projects,
truth commissions may be compared to constitution-making ... the TRC was
not a permanent institution, but was meant to facilitate the launching of a new
era.
Andrd du Toit, The Moral Foundations of the South African TRC, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE
MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS, supra note 10, at 124-25.
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cy of the individual in the modem west is a relatively new development in the
social imaginary of western nations, transitional societies try to develop the lan-
guage of democracy, human rights, and sometimes reconciliation in their social
imaginaries. These are "thin" languages that, when coupled with a newly narrat-
ed national history and culturally specific practices-like the palava hut media-
tion sessions in Liberia or traditional ceremonial practices in Sierra Leone s3
are "thickened" through TRC processes and the continual development of a
democratic political culture and thriving civil society. Numerous defenders of
TRCs claim they are laying the foundation for a "human rights culture" in a
society where one did not previously exist. 15 4
There are numerous ways that the work of TRCs actually begins trans-
forming a society's social imaginary. One dramatic example was the use of the
media in the South African TRC. Testimonies were shown on television and
played on radio nearly every night for roughly two years. These public testimo-
nies were regularly on the front page of newspapers and were often the impetus
and content of much public discussion in the years immediately following the
apartheid years. This popular dissemination of the work, and the copious
amounts of scholarship on the process in the years following its conclusion,
have done much to reshape the common understanding of what it means to be a
South African and the language that is used in public discourse. Another exam-
ple of how the work of TRCs influences the social imaginary of a country is the
public reception of the final report in Argentina. That volume has become one
of the best-selling books in Argentina's history and has had a significant effect
on the public understanding of Argentine history and the roots of the human
rights abuses and political repression that plagued the country.' 55 In some ways,
it has become the founding document of a new Argentine society and people. 56
III. CONCLUSION
TRCs, then, have two primary functions relevant to their relationship to
nonviolent social change movements: (1) institutionalizing democratic practices,
robust notions of justice, and human rights norms, and (2) continuing to reshape
a society's social imaginary in the same direction that principled nonviolent
action moves. Neither of these can be achieved fully in the short lifespan that
defines the work of TRCs, but they do take early and important steps in these
153 Tim Kelsall, Truth, Lies, Ritual: Preliminary Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission in Sierra Leone, 27 HuM. RTS. Q. 361, 361-91 (2005).
154 See, e.g., Ronald C. Slye, Amnesty, Truth, and Reconciliation: Reflections on the South
African Amnesty Process, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS, supra
note 10, at 182-84.
' Report of CONADEP (National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons),
NUNCAMAS.ORG (1984), http://www.nuncamas.org/english/library/nevagain/nevagain000.htm
(last visited on March 14, 2012).
156 See HAYNER, supra note 4, at 45-47.
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directions and lay the necessary foundation for them to be fully achieved later in
the life of a transitional society. While reconciliation is an important goal of
TRCs, they do not expect to reach it quickly. Rather, they understand the com-
plex nature of reconciliation, 15 especially on the social and political levels, and
humbly recognize the impact of their work. However, TRCs still understand that
the lofty goal of reconciliation cannot be achieved without such a foundation. A
society built on vengeance, lingering prejudices, and the lack of democratic
practices or a human rights culture will inevitably fail to achieve any minimal
notion of justice, never mind reconciliation. In light of this, then, TRCs are an
important tool available to societies in transition that take seriously the long,
arduous, and complex task of building a just, dare I say "good," society.
TRCs are only early, though vital, steps in remaking the social world of
a society. They make it possible for people to imagine a world that is just, dem-
ocratic, and reconciled, and then practice living in that world so that it may one
day become a reality. No, they do not achieve this goal immediately, and there
are often bumps along the way in the work of TRCs, but the goal is a worthy
one, and the alternatives proposed are not often feasible or up to the challenge.
Before a society can be just it must be able to imagine what justice looks like
and create the institutions that can sustain such a justice. This is the primary
purpose of TRCs. Societies facing transition have found no better tool to use in
constructing such a society. To miss this is to misunderstand what it means and
what it takes for a society to be good.
Historically, TRCs have often been instituted in nations in which nonvi-
olent social action was a critical component of the resistance or revolution that
led to the transition to democracy. This makes sense for several reasons: first,
the foundational principles that motivate and sustain prolonged nonviolent so-
cial action are the same principles that motivate the desire to pursue restorative
rather than retributive justice; second, principled nonviolent social action is usu-
ally chosen with an end goal of reconciliation in sight, and the desire to pursue
reconciliation rather than revenge can only be sustained in a transitional period
if that was a primary goal from the beginning of the resistance; and third, to
have the principles that undergird nonviolence be part of a nation's resistance
means that the social imaginary of that society has already had its social imagi-
nary begin to be transformed to include those principles that motivate both non-
violence and TRCs.
15 On the complexity of political reconciliation, see generally TRUDY GOVIER, TAKING
WRONGS SERIOUSLY: ACKNOWLEDGEMENT, RECONCILIATION, AND THE POLITICS OF SUSTAINABLE
PEACE (2006); COLLEEN MURPHY, A MORAL THEORY OF POLITICAL RECONCILIATION (2010);
ERNESTO VERDEJA, UNCHOPPING A TREE: RECONCILIATION IN THE AFTERMATH OF POLITICAL
VIOLENCE (2009); RALF K. WUSTENBERG, THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF RECONCILIATION : A
THEOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF WAYS OF DEALING WITH GUILT DURING THE TRANSITION TO
DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA AND (EAST) GERMANY (Randi H. Lundell trans., 2009). For case
studies of political reconciliation, see DILEMMAS OF RECONCILIATION: CASES AND CONCEPTS (Car-
ol A.L. Prager & Trudy Govier eds., 2003); RECONCILIATION, NATIONS AND CHURCHES IN LATIN
AMERICA (lain S. Maclean ed., 2006).
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Critics of TRCs in such contexts underestimate the important role TRCs
can play because they overlook this connection. We should not underestimate
the importance of the fact that there are now nations birthed, at least partially,
out of nonviolent action. This is a dramatically new development in the world.
In these places, there is the potential not only to learn new ways of overthrowing
unjust governments but to learn new ways of constructing a society. We now
know that imprisoning or killing the majority of a land's previous inhabitants or
imposing political policies on one's enemies as oppressive as those thrown off
are not the only ways to build a new society. Instead, a society can pursue rec-
onciliation with their enemies because nonviolent revolutions and their legacies
on social-political institutions and a people's social imaginary make it a legiti-
mate possibility. This is the potential of TRCs. They are an experiment, that we
do not yet know the outcome of, to institutionalize peace, justice, reconciliation,
and nonviolence in a society's social and political culture and institutions. I am
not convinced that there is as high a probability of success for TRCs in transi-
tional societies that did not have a significant nonviolent aspect to their revolu-
tions (though there is ample room for a truth commission in such a context), and
I am not yet convinced that every TRC, even in the "right" context will be "suc-
cessful," but I do know that it is in such contexts that even hoping for such a
way forward is a thinkable possibility. Nonviolence makes reconciliation a pos-
sibility in a way that violence and warfare cannot. The work of TRCs proves
that reconciliation can be more than a trite phrase, expedient rhetoric, or nayve
dream of nonviolent activists. They are serious attempts to institutionalize those
values that can sustain nonviolent and democratic social engagement long after
the revolution is complete. I have made this argument through a historical anal-
ysis of the case of South Africa with an eye toward the implications of that case
for TRCs in other contexts. Specifically, I have demonstrated the important
connections between the foundational principles of principled, nonviolent social
change and the foundational principles of restorative justice processes such as
TRCs. South Africa is especially apropos for making this comparison because
of the prominent role of Desmond Tutu in leading both the nonviolent arm of
the anti-Apartheid movement and the South African TRC. Because TRCs are
legal-political mechanisms and institutions, rather than purely civil society initi-
atives, they are able to institutionalize those shared foundational principles in a
way that nonviolent social action is unable. However, principled, nonviolent
social action does begin the process of transforming a society's social imagi-
nary. Thus, TRCs can both continue the transformation of a society's social
imaginary begun in nonviolent social action and institutionalize those founda-
tional principles of nonviolent social action and restorative justice in the legal
and political life of a young country.
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